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Which Configuration Hardening Checklist Will Make My Server Most Secure?
Introduction
Any information security policy or standard will include a requirement to use a ‘hardened build standard’. The concept of hardening is straightforward enough, but knowing which source of information you should reference for a hardening checklist when there are so many published can be confusing.
Server Hardening Checklist Reference Sources
The most popular ‘brands’ in this area are the Center for Internet Security or CIS hardening checklists (free for personal use), the NIST (aka National Vulnerability Database) provided National Checklist Program Repository or the SANS Institute Reading Room articles regarding hardening of Top 20 Most Critical Vulnerabilities.
All of these groups offer Configuration Hardening Checklists for most Windows Operating Systems, Linux variants (Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, RedHat Enterprise Linux aka RHEL, SUSE Linux), Unix variants (such as Solaris, AIX and HPUX), and firewalls and network appliances, (such as Cisco ASA, Checkpoint and Juniper).
These sources offer a convenient, one-stop shop for checklists but you may be better served by seeking out the manufacturer or community-specific checklists for your devices and Operating Systems. For example, Microsoft and Cisco offer very comprehensive hardening best-practice recommendations on their websites, and the various CentOS and Ubuntu communities have numerous secure configuration best practice tutorials across the internet.
So which checklist is the best? Which configuration hardening benchmark is the best and the most secure? If you consider that all benchmarks for say, Windows 2008 R2 are all seeking to eliminate the same vulnerabilities from the same operating system, then you quickly realize that there is naturally a high degree of commonality between then various sources. In short, they are all saying the same thing, just in slightly different terms. What is important is that you assess the relevant risk levels for your systems versus what compromises you can make in terms of reduced functionality in return for greater security.
Configuration Hardening and Vulnerability Management
It is important to distinguish between software-based vulnerabilities which require patching for remediation, and configuration based vulnerabilities which can only ever be mitigated. Achieving a hardened, secure build standard is really what a hardening program is all about as this provides a constant and fundamental level of security.
Configuration hardening presents a uniquely tough challenge as the level to which you can harden depends on your environment, applications and working practices. For example, removing web and ftp services from a host are good, basic hardening practices. However, if the host needs to act as a web server, then this is not going to be a sensible hardening measure!
Similarly, if you need remote access to the host via the network then you will need to open firewall ports and enable terminal server or ssh services on the host, otherwise these should always be removed or disabled to help secure the host.
Conversely, patching is a much simpler discipline, with a general rule that the latest version is always the most secure (but test it first just to make sure it works!).
Configuration Hardening Procedures
In a similar way that patching should be done at least once a month, configuration hardening must also be practiced regularly – it is not a one-time exercise.
Unlike patching, where new vulnerabilities to software packages are routinely discovered then fixed via the latest patches, new configuration-based vulnerabilities are discovered very seldom. For example, the CIS Server 2008 Benchmark has only been updated 3 times despite the Operating System having been available for nearly 5 years now. The initial benchmark, Version 1.0.0 was released in March 2010, and then updated to Version 1.1.0 in July the same year. There was then a recent update to Version 1.2.0 in September 2011.
However, even though new configuration best practices are rarely introduced, it is vital that the hardened configuration of your Windows Servers, Linux and Unix hosts and network devices are reviewed regularly because changes could be made at any time which may adversely affect the inherent security of the device.
When you consider that any checklist can typically comprise between 200 and 300 measures, verifying that all hardening measures are being consistently and continuously applied has to be an automated process.
This can be provided by vulnerability scanning appliances such as Nessus or Qualys, however these are limited in the range and depth of checks they can make unless they are given administrator or root access to the host under test. Of course, in doing so, this actually introduces additional security vulnerabilities, as the host is now accessible via the network and there is at least one more administrator or root account in circulation which could be abused.
Configuration Hardening – File Integrity Monitoring
The other limitation of scanning appliances is that they can only take a snapshot assessment of the device concerned. While this is a good way to check compliance of the device with a configuration hardening best practice checklist, there is no way to verify that the filesystem has not been compromised, for example, by a Trojan or other malware.
Summary
Continuous file integrity monitoring combined with continuous configuration hardening assessment is the only true solution for maintaining secure systems. While branded checklists such as the CIS Benchmarks are a great source of hardening best practices, they are not the only option available. In fact, manufacturer provided checklists are generally a more focused source of vulnerability mitigation practices. Remember that there may be a wide choice of checklists using different terms and language, but that ultimately there is only one way to harden any particular system. What is more important is that you apply the hardening measures appropriate for your environment, balancing risk reduction against operational and functional compromises.
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Source by Mark Kedgley
